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bstract
Group micro-lending has been used successfully in some parts of the world to expand the reach of microcredit programs. However, our study
hows that microfinance institutions in Kenya prefer individual lending which is associated with higher default rates compared to group lending.
he study also shows that high interest rates increase the odds of client delinquency while loan size is inversely related to delinquency. Given these
ndings, policymakers need to work for stability in the macro-environment to ensure interest rates charged by microfinance institutions (MFIs)
emain stable and affordable. Alternatively, MFIs can develop a graduated scale for charging interest rates in which credit is extended to groups at
rst to hedge the firm against repayment risk; following this, the firm identifies individuals within the groups whose credit risk has improved and
ssue progressive individual loans to them. Such individual loans would fetch higher returns in form of interest for MFI and boost their outreach,
educe delinquency, and enhance self-sufficiency.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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are highly risky since they are typically low net-worth indi-
viduals with little or no collateral that can be acquired by the
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.  Introduction
The operations of microfinance institutions1 in Kenya are
overned by the Microfinance Act of 2006. According to the Act,
icrofinance institutions (MFIs hereinafter) are classified into
nd registered in three different tiers: deposit-taking institutions
uch as commercial banks, credit-only non-deposit taking insti-
utions, and informal organizations. The latter category includes
∗ Corresponding author at: 2, St. David Street, Johannesburg 2050, South
frica.
E-mail addresses: kodongo03@gmail.com, kodongoc@yahoo.com
O. Kodongo), liliankendi73@yahoo.com (L.G. Kendi).
1 Johanna (1999) describes a microfinance institution as a financial institution
hose major activities include provision of small loans typically for working
apital, informal appraisal of borrowers and investors, provision of collateral
ubstitutes (such as group loans), the provision of social intermediation via
roup formation, and training in financial literacy and management capabilities.
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2013.05.001
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otating savings societies, club pools and financial services asso-
iations. The 52 MFIs, registered in Kenya with the objective
f facilitating access to financial services among the unbanked
oor, currently serve about 6.5 million clients with an outstand-
ng loan portfolio in excess of US$ 310 million.2 Despite the
nactment of the Microfinance Act in 2006 and the subsequent
roliferation of MFIs, available statistics show that 35.2% of
enyans are still unable to access formal financial services and
nother 30.2% are entirely excluded from accessing any form
f financial service.3
Worldwide, the microfinance sub-sector has had to contend
ith numerous challenges. One of the major challenges faced,
specially by personal loan programs of MFIs, is that borrowersFI in the event of default. A popular remedy to this problem
2 The 52 MFIs are those affiliated to the Association of Microfinance Institu-
ions of Kenya (AMFI), an organization registered in 1999 under the Societies
ct to build capacity of the microfinance industry in Kenya. The statistics were
ccessed February 11, 2013, from the AMFI website: http://www.amfikenya.
om/pages.php?p=1.
3 Information accessed December 9, 2012, from Central Bank of
enya website: http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financialsystem/microfinance/
ntroduction.aspx.
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nvolves requiring borrowers to apply for credit in voluntarily
ormed groups: since such borrowers know each other, safe bor-
owers will likely form their own groups, avoiding those with
igher risk profiles – this mitigates the adverse selection problem
Armendariz and Morduch, 2007).
The group lending model, first used in Bangladesh, may not
e exactly replicable in the Kenyan context: Bangladesh has an
rea of 147,600 km2 with 130 million people while Kenya has
n area of 580,400 km2 with 43 million people. This implies that
he information network in Kenya could be much weaker than
hat of Bangladesh where group lending model has operated effi-
iently; members of a group in Kenya may not be able to as fully
onitor how funds borrowed from MFI are used by their peers
s members of a Bangladeshi group. Nevertheless, the micro-
nance sector in Kenya has largely adopted the Bangladeshi
odel and runs two broad microcredit programs: personal lend-
ng and group lending.4 Credit is typically granted to finance
usiness/entrepreneurial activities under both programs but it is
elieved that significant unfulfilled market demand also exists
or personal loans to finance consumption and emergency needs
see also Woller, 2002).5 The two credit programs (personal
nd group lending) exhibit different characteristics defined by,
mong others, the rapidity of loan approval, repayment periods
defines as weeks or months), interest rates, and other program
pecific terms.
Dellien et al. (2005) discusses key differences between the
roup lending and individual lending programs. First, because
ime and effort is invested in building social networks that enable
roups to select members who are creditworthy under group
ending, the role of loan officers is to provide structure, training
n loan processes and administrative support. Under individual
ending, loan officers bear principle responsibility for loan deci-
ions; they screen, and monitor their clients as well as come
p with mechanisms of enforcing repayment. Second, the prin-
iple incentives for repayment of group loans is joint liability,
roup reputation, credit rating and future access to credit for
ach member, all of which are directly contingent on each mem-
er upholding their obligations. On the other hand, individual
ending programs use a variety of incentives such as collateral
equirements, co-signers and guarantors to promote repayment
nd repayment discipline is created by strict enforcement of
ontracts.
Each of the two lending programs has its strengths and weak-
esses. Armendáriz and Morduch (2000) observe that group
eetings facilitate education and training useful for clients with
mall experience and improve financial performance of their
usinesses. Other researchers (Godquin, 2004; Madajewicz,
011) argue that group lending helps mitigate the risks asso-
iated with information asymmetry: for instance, because group
4 In Kenya, as in Bangladesh, personal lending involves extending credit to
n individual borrower while group lending involves extending credit to two or
ore people who are held liable for each other’s credit (Maria, 2009).
5 In the context of microfinance credit, a business loan is a working capital
oan designed to facilitate growth, expansion and upgrade of a business while a
ersonal loan is an unsecured salary advance for customers to meet emergency
eeds (Faulu Kenya, 2012).
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orrowers are linked by joint liability, if one of them switches
rom safe to risky project (moral hazard), the probability that
er partner will have to pay the liability rises. This gives group
embers the incentive to monitor each other. The reduction in
roup members’ default through peer pressure and social ties
as also been discussed (Guttman, 2007; Dixon et al., 2007;
l-Azzam et al., 2011). However, Maria (2009) points out that
roup monitoring may be rendered ineffective where social ties
re loose, and the cost of monitoring each other high.
Group lending is not without setbacks. Savita (2007) argues
hat group lending is associated with additional costs including
roup formation costs, training borrowers on group procedures,
igher degree of supervision and a higher frequency of install-
ent payments. These costs increase interest rates of such
icrocredit loans leading to enhanced repayment risk. Other
esearchers argue that joint liability in group lending penalizes
ood credit risk customers (Giné and Karlan, 2010), could hinder
ptimal utilization of borrowed funds by clients (Madajewicz,
003) and might even jeopardize repayment since the incentive
f future credit is no longer present in the event that one member
ails to pay (Besley and Coate, 1995).
Individual lending programs also present several benefits.
or instance, Armendáriz and Morduch (2000) find that the
uarantor exerts sufficient social pressure on the client to repay
FI loans in Russia and Eastern Europe. However, Laure and
aptiste (2007) argue that the guarantee mechanism, especially
ersonal guarantees, is only meaningful if the borrower has
ssets that can be pledged as surety, if the institutional frame-
ork permits the actual transfer of ownership of the pledge from
he borrower to the creditor easily and if the pledged assets are
ot very liquid. The duo contends that these three conditions are
ot met in many developing countries. In particular, Kenya has a
igid judicial system with a large number of pending cases which
ay hinder timely transfer of pledge and most MFI borrow-
rs may not even have “that small collateral”. Another benefit
f individual lending is that it spares borrowers the negative
ffects such as time spent in group meetings and loss of pri-
acy when they discuss their financial situation and investment
rojects with the peers who could oppose such projects (Maria,
009) in the process impeding their individual growth (Giné and
arlan, 2010).
Given the strong arguments advanced in favor of both individ-
al and group lending, MFIs find it confusing making a choice
etween the two lending programs. We believe that the choice
hould be informed, in principle, by each firm’s philosophi-
al orientation. The provision of microcredit services has been
xplained by three philosophical arguments (Armendáriz and
orduch, 2000). First is the institutional approach, which argues
hat institutional sustainability is paramount so that MFIs should
e able to cover their operating and financing costs with program
evenue. The opposing view is the welfare approach, which
rgues that MFIs can attain sustainability without achieving
nancial self-sufficiency.6 Then there is the middle ground view,
6 The institutionalists argue that large scale outreach to the poor on a long-
erm basis cannot be guaranteed if MFIs are not financially sustainable while
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nown as the win-win approach, which argues for balancing the
oals of poverty alleviation and financial self-sustainability. Our
hesis is that microfinance institutions with high aversion to risk
scribe to the institutional approach and tend to prefer group
ending while those with lower aversion to risk tend to identify
ith the welfarists’ approach and prefer individual lending.
However, Hermes and Lensink (2009) have observed that a
ajority of MFIs are now focusing on financial sustainability
nd efficiency (the institutional approach) due to increasing
ompetition. Given this observation, it is our view that the risk
f delinquency should play a key role in informing the pref-
rence for either group lending or personal lending by MFIs.
mpirical investigations have pointed out a number of factors
hat may affect the likelihood of delinquency on microcre-
it obligations. Mokhtar et al. (2009) find that training to an
FI borrower, the loan amount advanced and age are sig-
ificant factors affecting loan default in Malaysia. Similarly,
aure and Baptiste (2007) find loan amount a significant vari-
ble affecting default in microcredit programs.7 The interest
ate has also been found to be an important factor affecting
icrocredit loan delinquency (Warui, 2012; Pereira and Mourao,
012).8
A key feature of MFIs that is often linked to delinquency
isk is the frequent collection of loan installments. According
o Field and Pande (2008), frequent repayments provide clients
ith a commitment device that helps them form a habit of sav-
ng (this facilitates loan repayment), and improves their trust in
oan officers and their willingness to stay on track with repay-
ents. However, frequent repayments increase transaction costs
nd increase default risk when clients graduate to larger loans
ince this increases the amount of their cash outlays. Default
isk has also been found to increase when loan officers fail to
ndertake their key roles – screening and encouraging clients,
nd training them on financial discipline – properly (Dixon
t al., 2007). Another factor that influences delinquency risk
s gender. Studies have shown that women often demonstrate
tronger willingness to pay than men (Armendariz and Morduch,
007; Phillips and Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007) largely because they
ave lower credit opportunities than men and hence must repay
heir loans to ensure continued access to credit and are easier
o monitor since they tend to stay closer to their homes than
en.
elfarists argue that the poor cannot afford higher interest rates, therefore, aim-
ng at financial sustainability ultimately goes against the goal of serving large
roups of poor borrowers.
7 The two studies contradict each other on the role of loan amount on client
efault. Mokhtar et al. (2009) find lower the loan amounts to be associated
ith higher chance of default since low loan amounts are mostly extended to
usiness beginners who lack experience on strategies of running a profitable
enture. However, the findings of Laure and Baptiste (2007) associate higher
oan amounts with higher likelihood of borrowers experiencing repayment prob-
ems because it becomes difficult for an individual MFI borrower to reimburse
xcessively high amounts if their ability to pay has not substantially changed
ince their first appraisal.
8 The two studies provide evidence suggesting that low interest rates, by reduc-
ng borrower cash outflows, result in low default risk under both individual and
roup lending.
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Our study sought to examine the two key microfinance
rograms with a view to evaluating their effectiveness in
ddressing the financial needs of the target beneficiaries (bor-
owers). We also sought to attribute loan delinquency under
ach program. The study proceeds on the premise that bor-
owers’ likelihood of default diminishes if their financial
eeds are satisfactorily addressed. Consequently, we evaluate
he effectiveness of a lending program through an analysis
f its propensity to loan delinquencies. Thus, microfinance
rograms that exhibit high tendencies for loan delinquency
re deemed not to effectively address borrowers’ financial
eeds.
Warui (2012) documents an increasing trend in level of loan
elinquency among MFIs in Kenya. This may be a pointer to
ncreased ineffectiveness of the institutions’ various lending
rograms. Although many studies (e.g., Guttman, 2007; Dixon
t al., 2007; Aniket, 2011; Al-Azzam et al., 2011) have analyzed
he pros and cons of group and individual lending, data sets
re often insufficient to draw meaningful inferences about the
ost suitable microcredit program. As we have shown through
 survey of the literature, researchers have advanced conflicting
rguments about the two lending programs. Such conflicting
rguments about the approach to use in delivering credit services
ave left a gap and uncertainty as to which is the appropri-
te credit program, particularly where default risk mitigation
s concerned.
A recent study almost similar to ours is Pereira and Mourao
2012). However, their study focuses on how MFIs can over-
ome credit defaults. For the purposes of their analysis, the duo
ategorizes the world into regions, which include the Middle
ast and North Africa (MENA). In their conclusions, however,
hey warn about the danger of generalizing default risk of MFI
redit since MFIs operate in places that are geographically iso-
ated and hence their borrowers exhibit varying characteristics.
n the Kenyan MFI context, there has never been a detailed com-
arative evaluation of the two microcredit programs. Therefore,
articipants in Kenya’s microfinance industry have no scien-
ific rationale for preferring one of the two lending programs
ver the other. And as our results show, sub-optimal decisions
ave been made by microfinance credit providers in as far as
aking the appropriate choice of a suitable lending program is
oncerned.
The key finding of this study is that group lending is bet-
er able to mitigate loan delinquency than personal lending. The
tudy proffers several policy suggestions. Among others, we rec-
mmend that the threshold for individual lending must include
emonstrable ability of a borrower to pay interest of at least
.8% per month. Group loans should be issued where this con-
ition is not met. Secondly, MFIs are advised to extend high
oan amounts (amounts in excess of KES 100,000) largely to
roup borrowers, which the study finds to show tendency for
ow default risk.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
usses the data; Section 3 presents the theoretical model and
escribes the study’s methodology; Section 4 presents and dis-
usses our findings; conclusions and policy implications are in
ection 5.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of some microcredit lending terms.
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness
Interest rate (%, monthly) 1.75 0.01 0.025 2.89 −0.957
Age (years) 37.13 0.36 24 62 0.930
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The data are pooled and analyzed using logistic regres-
sion. Suppose that the dependent variable, y, can be explained
9 The data is computed from the inflation figures obtained on Februaryoan amount (KES) 33,446.30 1487.56
epayment (no. of weeks) 14.61 0.25 
.  Data
A structured questionnaire was used to gather data from
oan officers and credit controllers at the head offices of the
icrofinance institutions registered by the Association of Micro-
nance Institutions of Kenya (AMFI). AMFI has a registered
embership of 52 firms of which 48 have their head offices in
enya’s capital, Nairobi. We surveyed all the 48 firms. How-
ver, only 35 firms returned filled questionnaires, of which three
ere incomplete or had missing information and were therefore
iscarded.
Over a period of three years, through November 30, 2012, and
or each loanee, data was gathered in respect of age, loan amount
ranted, repayment intervals, interest rates charged, whether
oan was granted to a loanee as part of a group or as an individ-
al, whether the loanee was given financial training, and whether
he account was delinquent. For the purposes of this analysis,
 customer’s account is deemed delinquent if it is classified as
ast due or has been declared to be in default by the concerned
nstitution. Many MFIs in Kenya consider a loan past due if a
eriod of four weeks or more has elapsed after the loan’s due
ate. The loan is considered in default if it is eight or more weeks
ast its due date or if at least 48 weeks have elapsed after the
rst payment and the customer is yet to settle the entire obliga-
ion. The maximum amount of time given to loanees to pay up
s typically 40 weeks and clients are generally expected to make
he same payment at each interval. Thus, the two delinquency
easures given above exclude customers who are taking long
o repay not because they are defaulting, but because perhaps
he interest rate is high and they need a longer period than the
0 weeks to fully settle their obligations to the MFI. We use the
ctual records kept by loan officers on defaulted and past due
ccounts. The survey was conducted in December 2012/January
013.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for some “lending
erms variables” used in the empirical analysis. MFIs compute
he interest payment to make it simple for the client to deci-
her. Thus, once the interest rate is agreed on between the client
nd the loan officer, the interest payment for the year (or loan
eriod if shorter) is computed and loaded on to the principal.
 repayment schedule is constructed by dividing the resulting
gure over the number of repayment weeks. This number is
hen adjusted up or down to reach a round weekly payment.
he table shows that the mean monthly nominal interest rate is
.75%, or about 21% per year, with negative skewness. Since the
tandard deviation is a paltry 0.01% per month, the bulk of the
oans given attract interest rates clustered around 1.75%; how-
ver, there are a few cases when interest rates exceed the mean
1
h
N
f5,000 250,000 3.301
4 40 2.138
alue. The mean interest rate appears high but the (annualized)
onthly inflation rate over the study period averaged 11.10%.9
hus, the real annualized interest rate on the microloans aver-
ged only 9.90%, which appears appropriate for the high risk
evels generally exhibited by microcredit applicants.
The mean age of a loanee is 37 years with a positive skew-
ess, implying that MFIs generally tend to avoid loaning to very
oung clients. A more in-depth analysis of the data indicates that
outhful applicants aged below 30 only represent 26% of the
otal number of loanees. This may be explained by the fact that
he majority of the loans are given for business/entrepreneurial
urposes and younger clients are most likely avoided due to their
elative business inexperience. Notably by the time the borrow-
rs have attained the age of 30–43 (64% of borrowers), they
ill have acquired adequate business knowledge hence should
resent lower default risk. The maximum amount of loan issued
y a microcredit lender is KES 250,000 to be repaid within 40
eeks. However, on the average, customers are extended loans
ith a repayment period of only 15 weeks, with a standard devia-
ion of 0.25 weeks. Clearly, lending terms appear pretty stringent
n Kenya’s microcredit market, making it very likely that clients
enerally strain to make good their obligations to the lending
rms.
.  Empirical  strategy
We use a structured questionnaire to gather data from loan
fficers and credit controllers of MFIs. The first part of the ques-
ionnaire uses a Likert-type scale in which each of the provided
hoice of answers is assigned an ordinal value, generating quan-
itative data that we interpret and present in frequency tables and
harts. The first set of data therefore provides general informa-
ion, particularly pertaining to factors considered by MFI loan
fficers when screening credit applicants. The second part of the
uestionnaire provides data that can explain loan delinquency
mong group and individual lenders. All the key potential factors
rom the literature are incorporated in the structured question-
aire and loan officers are requested merely to indicate the
ppropriate response in respect of each client.5, 2013, from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics website:
ttp://www.knbs.or.ke/news/lei122012.pdf. The inflation rate for the year
ovember 2010 through November 2011 was 19.72% and the inflation rate
or the year November 2011 through November 2012 was 3.25%.
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lending tends to derail the objective of financial sustainability
and threatens firms’ long-run survival. However, MFIs try to
“hedge” their exposure to the higher default risk by imposingO. Kodongo, L.G. Kendi / Review o
y a vector of r  independent variables (or factors), X.
hus,
 =  f (X) (1)
he logistic distribution function is expressed in the form (see,
.g., Gujarati, 2004):
 =  E(y  =  1|X) = 1
1 +  e−β′X (2)
here β  is the vector of coefficients and P  represents the odds of
success” for the dependent variable, y. Now suppose z  = β’X.
he distribution function in Eq. (2) can now be expressed in a
impler form as follows:
 = 1
1 +  e−z =
ez
1 +  ez (3)
he parameter z  has values ranging from −∞  to ∞  while P
anges from −1 to +1. It is important to note that P  is a nonlinear
unction of z  and hence nonlinear in X  and in β. Thus, the OLS
egression procedure cannot be used to estimate the parameters,
. However, Eq. (3) can be linearized, first by expressing it as a
unction of 1 −  P, the probability of “failure”:
 −  P  =  1 − 1
1 +  w−z =
1
1 +  ez (4)
ividing Eq. (3) by Eq. (4) yields
P
1 −  P =
1 +  ez
1 +  e−z =  e
z (5)
he quantity P/1 −  P  is the odds in favor of “success”. Taking
ogarithms on both sides gives
 =  ln
(
P
1 −  P
)
= z =  β′X (6)
 is known as the logit, hence the term logit (or logistic)
egression. Parameter estimates are typically interpreted in their
ntilogarithm form (Eq. (5)), which gives the odds in favor of
he dependent variable, y.
Finally, we gather data on the number of delinquent accounts
s a proportion of the total number of loans given for each of the
wo loan programs – group loans and individual loans. We use
his data to test the null hypothesis that the two proportions are
qual. This is tested against the alternative that the proportion
f delinquency is higher under individual lending programs.
.  Results
.1.  The  preference  for  group  or  individual  lending  among
FIs
We first sought to establish the philosophical orientation of
enya’s microcredit firms. Consistent with the observations of
ermes and Lensink (2009), our data show that 69% of MFIs
ursue institutional sustainability (or financial self-sufficiency)
n their lending policy. Only 6% of the surveyed firms lend with
he objective of poverty alleviation, or outreach to the poor, whileFig. 1. Services offered by MFIs in Kenya.
he rest (25%) seek both financial stability and poverty allevi-
tion (win–win approach). Next, we establish which services
re offered by the MFIs in the country. Fig. 1 presents our find-
ngs. The figure shows that credit provision comprise of 55% of
ervices offered by microfinance institutions while savings and
eposits constitute 15% each. The remaining services provided
y these institutions include insurance (6%) and “other” services
9%), which include money transfer and financial consultancy,
mong others. Now, credit services offered by MFIs can be in
he form of individual or group loans.
Fig. 2 presents the factors motivating the preference for either
f the two credit programs. The figure indicates that individual
ending is preferred by microfinance institutions whose goals
re to reach out to the poor, to minimize transaction costs and to
aintain market share (by pursuing low client dropouts). Con-
rarily, MFIs prefer group lending if their goal is to expand in size
r to lower delinquency and therefore increase their chance of
nancial sustainability and long-run survival. MFIs preferring
roup lending also point out the crucial roles of group meet-
ngs in screening repayment ability of the members, facilitating
ember training on business skills, and monitoring loan use.
espite the clear benefits associated with group meetings and
ower delinquency levels in group loans, we find that 75% of
icrocredit issued in Kenya goes to individual borrowers while
nly 25% of credit is extended to group borrowers. So, why do
enyan MFIs prefer individual lending? 86% of our respondents
ttribute this preference to poor information networks among
roup members that affect monitoring of loan usage.
Since it has relatively higher default risk in general, individualFig. 2. Microcredit approaches and reasons for their adoption.
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Table 2
Importance attached to factors considered in approving a loan application.
Factor Important Moderately important Very important Extremely important
Panel A: individual loans
Weekly loan repayment ability 14% 36% 25% 25%
Interest rate above 1.8% pm 19% 19% 29% 33%
No collateral 3% 21% 21% 55%
Age of applicant 18% 32% 36% 14%
Business loan 8% 27% 23% 42%
Consumption loan 14% 38% 34% 14%
Loan amount > KShs.100,000 – – 45% 55%
Panel B: group loans
Weekly loan repayment ability 25% 19% 38% 18%
Interest rate above 1.8% pm 23% 23% 27% 27%
No collateral 15% 26% 33% 26%
Age of applicant 21% 29% 33% 17%
Business loan 29% 25% 25% 21%
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vidual lending more attractive to MFIs than group lending.
This may explain the preference for individual lending among
MFIs.
Table 3
Average interest rates under the two microcredit programs.
Interest rate 1.2–1.8% pm Above 1.8% pm
Panel A: group lendingonsumption loan 37% 33% 
oan amount > KShs.100,000 11% 21% 
security” requirements on individual loan applicants. Security
efers to method of enforcing discipline in loan repayment. Our
ndings suggest that a large proportion (37%) of MFIs secure
heir individual loans through a third party guarantor, underly-
ng the suggestion that guarantors have the potential to exert
ufficient pressure on borrowers to pay because they are held
ersonally liable in the event that the guaranteed loanee defaults
Armendáriz and Morduch, 2000). The remaining firms secure
heir individual loans either through the specific pledge of col-
ateral (34%) or through cosigners (20%) or by legal action
9%).
.2.  Factors  affecting  the  preference  for  group  and
ndividual lending
To mitigate adverse selection problems, microfinance insti-
utions, like most conventional credit providers, take their loan
pplicants through an elaborate screening procedure before
ranting a loan. The key factors considered in the screen-
ng process are displayed in Table 2. As evident from the
wo panels in the table, the degree of importance attached to
arious factors in approving a loan, depends on the lending pro-
ram. It is generally important for the MFI to check clients’
epayment ability under both programs; this is because under
ither of the lending programs, borrowers are expected to repay
he loans in frequent installments, typically weekly. This is
ecause, as well as protecting micro-lenders from huge cash out-
ows, frequent repayments provide clients with a commitment
evice that helps them form a habit of saving, hence facilitating
oan repayment (Field and Pande, 2008; Pereira and Mourao,
012).
Closer check of the purpose of the loan (business use or
onsumption) by MFI loan officers is done under individual
ending (panel A) while this factor appears to be of less impor-
ance for group borrowers (panel B); this implies that groups
re assumed to be responsible for monitoring their members
nd it does not really matter what use each individual member
f the group declares to the MFI. Where loan amounts greater
P
P
P20% 10%
21% 46%
han KES 100,000 are to be disbursed, microfinance lenders
et individual borrowers more heavily (55% extremely impor-
ant, panel A) than group borrowers (46% extremely important,
anel B). This is a pointer to the fact that individual bor-
owers are generally regarded to be of higher risk than group
orrowers. In both cases, however, the finding that extreme
mportance is attached to this factor appears to suggest that
FIs would be hesitant to extend huge amounts of credit to
heir borrowers in general. The age of loan applicant is also
enerally regarded as a key variable in the screening exer-
ise.
Because of their higher default probabilities, individual bor-
owers are generally charged a higher default premium. Thus,
FIs place extreme importance on individual borrowers’ abil-
ty to pay interest rate above 1.8% per month and to provide
ollateral (panel A). The interest rates charged under the two
rograms are reported in Table 3. The table shows that group
ending attracts interest rates in the range 1.2–1.8% per month
hile under individual lending, borrowers are mostly charged
bove 1.8% per month.
This finding is consistent with the earlier explanation that
roup lending would be preferred because of lower average
elinquency levels and social collateral. From another perspec-
ive, the higher interest rates on individual lending translate
nto potentially higher average returns which may make indi-ercentage of MFIs 80% 20%
anel B: Individual lending
ercentage of MFIs 39% 61%
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Table 4
Logistic regression estimation results.
Variables LR/
Constant INT AGE LAMT RPT CAT Wald
Eq. (1) 4.68** 1.44*** −0.02 −0.56*** −0.03 0.83*** 33.19
(2.49) (2.80) (−1.63) (−3.30) (−1.28) (2.84) [0.00]
Eq. (2) – 1.87*** −0.02 −0.23** −0.03 1.12*** 70.37
(3.40) (−1.21) (2.46) (−1.19) (4.09) [0.00]
The sample consists of 420 clients about whom we obtained data from the surveyed MFIs. The LR/Wald is the chi-square statistic (with five degrees of freedom),
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Oespectively for the models with constant and with constant restricted to zero, fo
espectively are interest rates, age of client in years, natural log of loan amoun
rackets are the z-statistics (calculated with robust standard errors) of the repor
.3.  Causes  of  delinquency  in  microﬁnance  lending
rograms
The potential factors determining loan delinquency among
icrofinance loanees have been alluded to in our findings
eported in Section 4.2 as well as in the literature (Adongo
nd Stock, 2005; Field and Pande, 2008; Field et al., 2010).
hese factors include interest rates, age, loan amount, repayment
eriod and loan category (group or individual). We examine
he relative importance of these five factors on the probabil-
ty of default on microcredit. To achieve this, we run a logistic
egression with these factors explaining loan delinquency (the
ependent variable). We estimate the following model:
ELi =  β0 +  β1INTij +  β2AGEij +  β3AMTij
+  β4RPTij +  β5CATij +  εi
here for each client i and lender j, INTij is the interest rate
harged; AGEij is the age of client; AMTij is the amount of
redit advanced; RPTij is the number of weeks after which loan
ust have been fully cleared; and CATij, the category of loan
ranted, takes the value “0” if the client was a member of a
roup and “1” if the loan was given to the client as an individ-
al. Following Field and Pande (2008), the dependent variable
delinquency rate, DELi) is a dummy which takes on a value of
1” if a client’s loan account was delinquent and “0” otherwise.
oefficients estimates are evaluated for significance against het-
roskedasticity robust standard errors.
We estimate two equations, one with an intercept term, the
ther with the intercept restricted to zero. Our results, presented
n Table 4, show that coefficient estimates are qualitatively sim-
lar for the two equations.10 However, the test for the restriction
hat all coefficients are zero is better for the second equation,
ndicating that our regression model performs better with the
onstant restricted to zero. The results suggest that the interest
ate is a significant (at the 1% level) variable influencing MFI
oan delinquency. For an increment in the interest rate by, say
% monthly, the odds in favor of a delinquency increase by
10 Our preliminary investigation with OLS regression indicates that the model
erforms better (in terms of R-squared) with the constant restricted to zero
han with the constant included. Here, we examine both equations. Since the
oefficient estimates are qualitatively similar, the discussion that follows focuses
n results of the second equation.
1
g
d
r
i
t
t
i
rypothesis that all the five variables are zero. INT, AGE, LAMT, RPT and CAT
yment period in weeks and loan category (group or individual). The values in
efficients; p-values of the reported chi-square statistics are in square brackets.
.87%. That is, microcredit accounts are about 6.5 times (i.e.,
xp 1.87) more likely to experience delinquency if interest rates
ncreased by 1 percentage point. This is consistent with the works
f Appiah (2012) and Carty (2012) who find that loan defaults
ncrease as interest rates increase because the borrower now has
o earn more money to be both self-sustaining and pay back her
oan. The ability to do both becomes increasingly difficult, and
f the interest rate is high enough, it can become impossible to
epay a loan. If more and more borrowers default on their loans
ue to high interest rates, again, microfinance institutions have
ess money to lend to those who need the loans and are exposed
o the risk of failure.
Results also suggest that loan size is a significant factor (at the
% level) influencing loan delinquency. In particular, an incre-
ent in log loan amount by 1 unit translates into a decline in
dds in favor of delinquency by 0.23. Put differently, a unit incre-
ent in the log of the loan size results in a 26% (exp 0.23–1)
ecline in the chance that a microcredit client would fail to meet
er obligations on the loan. This finding may suggest, consis-
ent with Mokhtar et al. (2009), that the lower the loan amount,
he higher the chance of default since low loan amounts are
ostly extended first to business beginners who lack experience
n strategies of running a profitable venture and secondly, to
ore risky borrowers. The inverse relationship between DEL
nd LAMT  may also lend itself to the interpretation that group
orrowers tend to be less delinquent than individual borrowers.
his inference is premised on the argument that since large loan
mounts are associated with group borrowers (who have lower
efault risk), larger loan amounts must be associated with fewer
ncidents of delinquency.
The latter inference is corroborated by the coefficient of CAT
 the loan category. Results show that loan category, a binary
ariable with a value of “1” for individual loans and “0” for group
oans is a significant (at 1%) variable affecting loan delinquency.
ur findings indicate that individual loanees are three times (exp
.12) more likely to default on their microcredit obligations than
roup borrowers. Given this finding, it is not clear why microcre-
it in Kenya institutions prefer to issue individual loans and the
eason given by many MFIs than group monitoring effectiveness
s compromised by weaker social cohesion in Kenya seems not
o be convincing. Since most Kenyan MFIs pledge allegiance
o the philosophy of self sustenance and institutional stability,
t would be in their best interest to take advantage of superior
epayment prospects offered by group borrowers. Further, the
1 f Development Finance 3 (2013) 99–108
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Table 5
t-Test: two-sample assuming unequal variances.
Defaulted proportion
(individual lending)
Defaulted proportion
(group lending)
Mean 0.425 0.170
Variance 0.148 0.024
Hypothesized mean difference 0
Calculated t-statistic 6.40
P(T ≤ t), one-tail <0.0001
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ocial collateral offered by groups would reduce the need for and
he expenses associated with loan guarantors, commonly used
n Kenya to provide security in microcredit contracts. The for-
al relationship between individual/group borrowing and loan
elinquency is investigated and discussed in Section 4.4.
Although not statistically significant, loan delinquency is
nversely related to AGE. Similar results have been documented
y Mokhtar et al. (2009) and Bhatt and Tang (2002) both of
hom suggest that older borrowers would be more responsible
nd disciplined in repaying their loans than younger borrowers.
he lack of experience in the business involved, which results in
ess income received, might be the reason that the younger crop
f borrowers has difficulty repaying their loans.
Finally, the repayment period (RPT) is not a significant
ariable influencing delinquency; this fact is explained by the
bservation that irrespective of whether the lending is to groups
r to individuals, and irrespective of the loan size, microcredit
orrowers are required to make weekly installments over a max-
mum of forty weeks. There is an inverse relationship between
elinquency and repayment. Field and Pande (2008) explain this
elationship thus: if individuals are rational and function in a full
nformation environment, then a less rigid repayment schedule
hould never increase default or client delinquency. Rather, by
ncouraging longer term investments it may improve clients’
ong run repayment capacity. In addition, clients incentives
o repay according to the assigned schedule is driven entirely
y fear of losing access to future loans from their provider
hile at the same time, less frequent repayment allows clients
o accumulate enough funds from their business to guarantee
rompt repayment and business survival. Contrarily, Mokhtar
t al. (2009) find that a weekly loan repayment schedule posed
roblems for borrowers who generated a lower revenue cycle
nd suggested that MFIs should consider lowering the weekly
epayment amount and providing longer duration of payments
n response to borrowers who generate lower revenue and have
 problem meeting their weekly repayment obligations.
The diagnostic statistics show that the model is well fitted.
n particular, the p-value of the Wald-statistic indicates that the
ypothesis that the five factors jointly have zero explanatory
ower on the probability of delinquency is rejected at the 1%
evel of significance.
.4.  Individual  versus  group  lending  and  loan  delinquency
This analysis seeks to answer the research question: which
ne of individual and group lending programs presents lower
isk of default? Thus, the analysis seeks to establish whether
bserved differences in default proportions under the two lend-
ng arrangements are statistically significant. Therefore, we test
he null hypothesis that the delinquency proportions under the
wo lending arrangements are equal. This is tested against the
lternative that the proportion of loan delinquency is higher
nder the individual lending program.To make inferences, we compare the calculated value of the t-
tatistic with the critical or tabulated value of the t-statistic. If the
alculated value of the t-statistic is greater than the critical value,
e reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the alternative
c
i
t
aritical t-statistic, one-tail 1.65
ypothesis is probably true. Results of the analysis are presented
n Table 5.
From the statistics in Table 5, it is evident that the mean
roportion of delinquency under individual lending (0.425) is
igher than the mean proportion of delinquency under group
ending (0.17). The lower part of the table tests the hypothesis
hat these two values are statistically equal. The computed value
f the t-statistic (6.40) is greater than the critical value of the
-statistic (1.65). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the differ-
nce between the two proportions is equal must be rejected. A
imilar conclusion can be drawn by looking at the p-value of the
-statistic, which indicates that the mean default proportion for
ndividual lending is statistically higher than that of group lend-
ng at the 1% level. From these results, this study concludes that
roup lending program is more effective than individual lending
rogram in mitigating the risk of default among MFI clients.
t therefore appears irrational for microfinance firms to prefer
ndividual lending to group lending.
.  Conclusions
In countries such as Kenya where poverty levels are high and
nancial services do not reach the vast majority, microcredit is
mportant in encouraging entrepreneurial activity and alleviat-
ng poverty. However, microcredit can only be effective if it is
udiciously used to ensure that both the lender and the borrower
eap the maximum possible gain. Group lending has been used
uccessfully in some parts of the world (notably by the Grameen
ank) to expand the reach of microcredit programs. However,
ur study shows that microfinance institutions in Kenya prefer
ndividual lending which is more “wasteful” in the sense that
t cannot effectively address borrowers’ financial needs. This
s reflected in the higher default levels associated with indi-
idual lending compared to group lending. Loan delinquency
s a suitable surrogate for loan effectiveness in addressing the
orrower’s financial needs because the higher the probability
f default, the lower is the chance that the loan improved the
orrower’s welfare.
Other key causes of delinquency are the rate of interest and
he loan size. Our study shows that high interest rates signifi-
antly increase the odds of client delinquency while loan size is
nversely related to delinquency. The latter finding is attributed to
he fact that lower amounts are typically extended to individual
nd younger borrowers while larger loans are generally issued
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Thesis).
Madajewicz, M., 2011. Joint liability versus individual liability inO. Kodongo, L.G. Kendi / Review o
o group borrowers. Clearly, group lending appears to command
n edge over individual lending in mitigating loan default.
Our findings suggest important implications for policy.
conomic policymakers need to work for stability in the macro-
nvironment to ensure interest rates charged by microfinance
nstitutions remain not just stable but also affordable. This
esearch has identified high interest rates as a key cause of loan
efault. As a policy suggestion, the interest rate problem could
e solved via developing a graduated scale for charging inter-
st rates; for instance, under group lending, once a group of
afe borrowers is able to consistently repay their loan for say
2 months, the group size could be increased by allowing them
o include other safe borrowers. This will in turn reduce the
verall group and transaction costs, the older members of the
roup could then be charged lower interest rates relative to the
ew members; this would have a double positive effect since it
ould encourage the new group members to repay their loans
o as to benefit from lower interest rates in future and the overall
epayment rate would improve.
The results of this research imply that the two microcre-
it programs can be reconciled. Individual lending programs
re characterized by relatively higher interest rates, collateral
equirements, more autonomy on use of loans and higher default
ates amongst others. Microfinance institutions can design their
oan programs such that, at first credit is extended to groups;
n that way they will be hedged against repayment risk. Group
odels help individuals to be more financially stable. Follow-
ng this, MFIs can identify individuals within the groups whose
redit risk has improved and issue progressive loans as suggested
y Armendáriz and Morduch (2000). Individual lending will in
urn fetch higher returns in form of interest for MFI; in this way
FI’s outreach, low delinquency, low cost and self-sufficiency
ill be more easily achieved.
MFIs should induce self-selection of borrowers by offer-
ng contracts with different terms. For instance, a contract with
ow interest rates accompanied by high degree of joint liability
ould attract safe borrowers while a contract with high interest
ates and low level of joint liability could be offered to more
isky group borrowers and individual borrowers. In this way, the
evel of default on loans will reduce. In addition, MFIs need to
ppraise borrowers thoroughly to determine the loans appropri-
te for them. Where borrowers are not highly risky, increasing
he group size might substantially reduce the costs associated
ith group lending.
An important caveat is that client behavior may be sensi-
ive to the number of alternative credit sources available to
hem (Field and Pande, 2008). The importance of this issue
ncreases as the number of MFIs and level of competition among
hem rise. If the primary penalty for default or delinquency is
enial of future loans, clients will presumably be more will-
ng to risk bad behavior as their alternative options expand.
n such cases, factors such as repayment schedule may have
 marginal impact on delinquency and default. However, the
ecent licensing of credit reference bureaus in Kenya may serve
o check the proliferation of such unethical conduct. Needless
o say, further research is required in Kenya to address this
oncern.lopment Finance 3 (2013) 99–108 107
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